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AT THE END OF THE CLINICAL TRIAL: 

DOES ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL 

TECHNOLOGY END AS WELL? 

RICHARD S. SAVER* 
Medical research subjects increasingly are demanding (and 
litigating about) continued access to investigational technology af­
ter the clinical trial has concluded. This Article undertakes a criti­
cal review of the legal, ethical, and policy issues that arise in post­
trial access disputes. The regulatory and reimbursement objectives 
of many key stakeholders affected by the clinical trial testing pro­
cess-research subjects, drug companies, device manufacturers, in­
vestigators, payers, and regulatory agencies-are not always 
aligned, leading to difficult tensions. Post-trial access disputes de­
serve greater regulatory and scholarly attention, and remain quite 
difficult to resolve, precisely because these distinct stakeholder per­
spectives become particularly salient and the differences pragmati­
cally all the more important at the end of the clinical trial. A 
study'S conclusion is a critical juncture and can become a 
flashpoint for general conflict. At the end of a study, many of the 
stakeholders have already invested and committed significant re­
sources (both personal and financial) to the clinical trial, yet now 
may find their expectations for what should happen next abruptly 
frustrated or overridden by other interests. This Article considers 
the primary legal and ethical arguments, as well as policy consider­
ations, for offering subjects greater post-trial access to investiga­
tional technology and also explores important reasons for rejecting 
such access demands. An incremental reform approach is recom­
mended, one that moves beyond the status quo-where subjects 
have generally weak rights to post-trial access-yet avoids the dan­
gers and possible counterproductive effects of unbounded post­
trial access. Two preliminary suggestions are offered to help move 
in this direction: (1) requiring more detailed regulatory review of 
plans and budgets for post-trial access before clinical trial proto­
cols are approved; and (2) providing subjects, in certain situations, 
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other benefits as an alternative to continued access to the study 
technology. 
INTRODUCTION 
Investigational medical technology presents difficult questions 
for health law and policy regarding access. Patients and health care 
providers often want to use experimental drugs, new medical de­
vices, and other investigational technology before these products 
have completed testing in clinical trials and received final regula­
tory approvals for regular clinical care.1 Indeed, when conventional 
treatments are not working, critically ill patients may perceive in­
vestigational technology as their only hope. Expanded access re­
spects patient and provider autonomy, responds to individual 
health needs, and diffuses medical advances more rapidly to clinical 
practice. Yet these objectives often run up against equally impor­
tant regulatory and population health considerations favoring re­
stricted access. Risks to the population are minimized by ensuring 
that investigational technology undergoes sufficient safety and effi­
cacy testing, usually through formal clinical trials, before the tech­
nology is approved for marketing and public distribution. In 
addition, unrestricted utilization of still unproven and possibly cost­
ineffective technology adds additional cost pressures to a health 
care financing system already straining under limited resources. 
Until now, access disputes have typically concerned whether 
patients must participate in medical research in order to receive in­
vestigational technology. Consider the example of experimental 
drugs not yet approved for general commercial use by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).2 Under FDA law, pharmaceutical 
companies generally cannot supply experimental drugs unless in 
connection with clinical trials that are testing the medication and 
gathering data for the FDA-approval process.3 Litigation efforts by 
patients to demand non-approved technology outside of a clinical 
trial have generally met with limited success, dating from the 
1. See, e.g., Judy Foreman, For Some, Untested Drug Is a Last Chance, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2003, at C3. 
2. Experimental medical devices and other investigational technology are subject 
to different regulatory approval procedures and usage rules than experimental drugs. 
This discussion uses experimental drugs as an example of the more general pattern of 
restricting access to investigational technology outside of a clinical trial. 
3. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(b) (2008); see also id. § 312.34 (describing limited oppor· 
tunities for "treatment use" of investigational new drugs even when outside of clinical 
trial participation). 
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Laetrile battles of earlier decades to the more recent Abigail Alli­
ance litigation concerning access to experimental cancer drugs.4 
The other typical access battle involves reimbursement. Even 
after investigational medical technology has obtained full regula­
tory approval for commercial use and health care providers can le­
gally prescribe it in ordinary clinical practice, patients may not have 
health care coverage for it. Private health care payers typically ex­
clude coverage in their insurance contracts for experimental or 
medically unnecessary services; an exclusion that can be applied to 
all sorts of investigational and newly approved technology.s Pay­
ment rules under governmental health care programs such as Medi­
care and Medicaid similarly restrict reimbursement for 
investigational technology.6 A great deal of litigation has involved 
patients challenging such coverage exclusions.7 
This Article concerns a different type of access dispute that has 
not received equivalent attention to date, yet is emerging as a con­
tinuing problem, especially as the amount of experimentation with 
human subjects steadily increases: what should happen at the end of 
a clinical trial? Medical research subjects increasingly are demand­
ing (and litigating about) continued access to investigational tech­
nology after the clinical trial has concluded.s Unfortunately, there 
4. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008) 
. (Erbitux); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (Laetrile). 
5. See Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why Are the Courts 
Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1992); see also Rollo v. 
Blue CrosslBlue Shield of N.J., No. 90-597, 1990 WL 312647 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) 
(involving a claim against a health insurance plan for an exclusion of experimental 
medicine). 
6. See 42 U.S.c. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). 
7. See, e.g., Rollo, 1990 WL 312647. See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. 
Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 
(1992); Saver, supra note 5. 
8. A related form of access dispute, beyond the scope of this Article, concerns 
subjects seeking access to investigational technology during the trial, as opposed to at 
the end. During the trial not all participating subjects enjoy access to the investiga­
tional technology. In randomized studies, comparing "control" standard treatment 
groups against groups receiving the investigational technology, some subjects will be 
assigned the standard treatment even when they wanted access to the investigational 
technology. This also can lead to access conflict. For example, in Stewart v. Cleveland 
Clinic Foundation, 736 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999), the plaintiff was assigned to 
the standard treatment arm of a cancer study and received radiation and surgery but no 
preoperative chemotherapy (the investigational intervention). The plaintiff sued, rais­
ing various informed consent claims including that he had not been told about the pos­
sibility of receiving the investigational intervention outside of the clinic trial. An Ohio 
appellate court ruled that the plaintiff's informed consent claim was sufficient to survive 
summary judgment, but there was no ruling on the merits, and the case eventually set­
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does not appear to be a firm consensus regarding how best to 
respond to such access demands. Many difficult questions arise for 
health law and policy: Do the subjects who participated in the 
research have any valid claims, legally or ethically, for continued 
access to the study technology? Should they have priority access 
over others? Should sponsors and investigators have discretion to 
inform subjects during the consent process that the trial may be 
terminated at any time and, if so, that there will be no opportunity 
for continued access to the investigational technology? If there are 
obligations to provide subjects with continued access, are they 
borne equally by the clinical investigators, trial sponsors, and medi­
cal centers where the research is conducted? And does ensuring 
access mean only providing subjects an opportunity to continue re­
ceiving the technology or also paying for it? 
In some respects, post-trial access disputes are merely new 
variations on the more traditional problem of patients demanding 
access to investigational technology without participating in a 
clinical trial at all. Both types of disputes-post-trial and sans­
trial-implicate many common themes: tensions between patient 
and provider freedom of choice versus the governmental public 
health interest in controlled access and systematic testing; difficul­
ties health care payers encounter in deciding whether and when to 
reimburse new health care technology of uncertain efficacy, safety, 
and cost-effectiveness; and the often unclear distinctions between 
truly experimental medicine, innovative therapy, and ordinary 
clinical care. 
Yet, as this Article explores, post-trial access disputes arise in a 
special context, one that provides provocative new perspectives on 
the access conundrum. To start, the legal status and reasonable ex­
pectations of a clinical trial subject who has already participated in 
medical research seem very different from the status and expecta­
tions of the ordinary patient. Also, consistent with the general 
theme of this symposium-regulation and reimbursement of health 
care technology-post-trial access disputes have important, perhaps 
somewhat unappreciated, implications regarding oversight and fi­
nancing of health care technology. 
The clinical trial serves as the primary gateway for new medical 
technology to diffuse into general clinical practice.9 Successful 
tied. See id. at 501-02; see also Jerry Menikoff, The Hidden Alternative: Getting Investi­
gational Treatments Off-Study, 361 LANCET 63,64,66 (2003). 
9. See Phases of an Investigation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008). 
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completion of clinical trial testing is usually required for investiga­
tional technology to obtain full regulatory approval,1o Accordingly, 
the clinical trial becomes a critical step as a matter of regulation and 
reimbursement. From a regulatory perspective, required clinical 
trial testing serves a risk management function, ensuring that poten­
tially dangerous new technology is monitored and adverse exposure 
is limited until better consensus about the technology emerges. 11 
From a reimbursement perspective, clinical trial testing generates 
preliminary efficacy and (sometimes) cost -effectiveness data, as­
sessment information that is quite important to governmental and 
private payers deciding whether, and under which conditions, to of­
fer coverage for a new medical technologyY However, the regula­
tory and reimbursement objectives of the many key stakeholders 
affected by the clinical trial testing process-research subjects, drug 
companies, device manufacturers, investigators, payers, and regula­
tory agencies-are not always aligned, leading to difficult tensions. 
Post-trial access disputes are quite difficult to resolve because 
these distinct stakeholder perspectives become particularly salient, 
and the differences more important, at the end of the clinical trial. 
A study's conclusion is a critical juncture and can become a 
flashpoint for general conflict and for inconsistent regulatory and 
reimbursement agendas to surface. By the end of a study many of 
the stakeholders have already invested and committed significant 
resources-both personal and financial-to the clinical trial, yet 
may find their expectations for what should happen next abruptly 
frustrated or overridden by other interests. 
For example, after the research study ends, subjects may highly 
value continued access to an investigational technology, even if it 
seemingly offers only marginal therapeutic improvement.13 Sub­
jects who have risked harm or experienced other research-related 
burdens for the good of the clinical trial will likely feel entitled to 
recoup any possible treatment benefit suggested by the study. But 
an investigator may have less regard for subjects' post-trial access 
needs and place more value on ensuring that the trial continues to a 
10. See id. 
11. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 705-06 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("Current law bars public 
access to drugs undergoing clinical testing on safety grounds."), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 
1069 (2008). 
12. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21. 
13. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick & Andrew Goldstein, At Your Own Risk, 
TIME, Apr. 22, 2002, at 46 (noting that when one clinical trial was terminated for safety 
reasons, twelve participants fought to be allowed to continue the trial). 
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valid statistical stopping point, or even that altogether new trials are 
conducted with different subjects to resolve the research issue 
presented to a reasonable degree of scientific acceptability. A 
pharmaceutical company sponsoring the clinical trial may also have 
less regard for subjects' post-trial access needs and conclude, for 
business reasons, such as likely unfavorable reimbursement from 
health care payers, that the new technology is no longer worth de­
veloping, even if it showed some benefit in the medical study. The 
FDA, meanwhile, may focus its regulatory review on whether the 
trial data justifies approving the technology for commercial use 
with clinical patients generally, as opposed to concern for what hap­
pens to individual subjects once a particular trial shuts down. 
Despite the important and often conflicting interests impli­
cated, post-trial access disputes have generally received insufficient 
regulatory and scholarly attention. Part of this is because, as noted, 
the more frequent access battles have typically occurred with pa­
tients (as opposed to already enrolled research subjects). Also, 
long-standing concerns about protecting research subjects from 
physical harm, deception, and exploitation have meant that law and 
ethics pay a great deal of attention to the beginning stages of a 
clinical trial,14 including what goes on in subject recruitment, what 
needs to be disclosed during the informed consent process, how 
study risks and benefits are evaluated, and how protocols get ini­
tially approved. What happens once the trial is over has simply 
been much farther off the radar screen. Moreover, to the extent 
that post-trial access disputes have attracted attention, much of the 
focus has been on international research, including HIV and hepati­
tis studies. In these clinical trials, concerns have been raised about 
possible exploitation of subjects in developing countries because 
the subjects do not have access to the study technology, or afford­
able health care more generally, once their study participation 
ends.15 While these subjects will rarely enjoy the benefits of post­
14. See generally Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in Clinical Research, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 387 (2005); Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in 
Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Prac­
tice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1986); Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human 
Subjects Research: The Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EM­
ORY LJ. 327 (2003). 
15. See, e.g., Christine Grady, The Challenge of Assuring Continued Post- Trial 
Access to Beneficial Treatment,S YALE 1. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 425, 431-32 
(2005) (explaining that an HIV prevention study that would have involved almost 1000 
Cambodian sex workers fell through because of demands to provide the participants 
health care following the conclusion of the research); see also The Participants in the 
417 2009] AT THE END OF THE CLINICAL TRIAL 
trial access, the technology, once testing is completed, will be made 
commercially available to benefit patients in richer countries.16 Yet 
the basic problem of access after research participation ends is not 
limited to international studies. Domestic research subjects also 
may face quite limited access opportunities post-trial. 
In an attempt to address the neglect of post-trial access dis­
putes, this Article undertakes a critical review of the key legal, ethi­
cal, and policy issues that arise. The Article purposefully avoids 
making definitive conclusions about whether and when to accom­
modate subjects' demands for expanded post-trial access. Instead, 
it aims to provide a more complete, balanced, and nuanced frame­
work for thinking about post-trial access claims, and to highlight the 
difficult questions that will likely emerge for health law and policy. 
Part I briefly explains what drives research subjects' access de­
mands, discusses representative post-trial access disputes, and ex­
plains how investigators and sponsors have considerable discretion 
to limit subjects' post-trial access to investigational technology. 
Part II reviews how current law and ethics guidance is sufficiently 
"grey," often offering unclear direction regarding what obligations 
are owed to subjects at the end of the study. Part III analyzes, at a 
more theoretical level, the primary legal and ethical arguments, as 
well as policy considerations, for offering subjects greater post-trial 
access to investigational technology. This section also considers im­
portant reasons for rejecting such access demands. Part IV advo­
cates moving beyond the status quo-where subjects generally have 
weak rights to post-trial access-yet suggests an incremental reform 
approach that is sensitive to the dangers and possible counter­
productive effects of unbounded post-trial access. It offers two pre­
liminary suggestions to help move in this direction: (1) more 
required regulatory review of plans and budgets for post-trial access 
before clinical trial protocols are approved; and (2) providing sub­
jects, in certain situations, other benefits as an alternative to contin­
ued access to the study technology. 
2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, Moral Stan­
dards for Research in Developing Countries: From "Reasonable Availability" to "Fair 
Benefits", HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2004, at 17 [hereinafter Moral Standards 
for Research in Developing Countries]. 
16. See, e.g., Peter Lurie & Sidney M. Wolfe, Unethical Trials of Interventions to 
Reduce Perinatal Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Developing 
Countries, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 853 (1997) (discussing HIV trials); Moral Standards 
for Research in Developing Countries, supra note 1515, at 24-26 (discussing clinical tri­
als of Havrix, a hepatitis A vaccine, in northern Thailand). 
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I. POST-TRIAL ACCESS-WHAT DRIVES THESE DISPUTES 

AND REPRESENTATIVE CASES 

A. Access Demands and Expectations of Research Subjects 
Research subjects certainly deserve praise and respect for vol­
unteering for experiments that contribute to the progress of medi­
cal knowledge and likely help future patients more than themselves. 
But the altruistic aspect of research participation should not be 
overstated. Subjects volunteer for trials for a variety of complex 
reasons. Apart from altruism, subjects may enroll in clinical trials 
because of a sense of hopelessness, general optimism about new 
technology and medical innovation, or a seeming need to take ac­
tion rather than face their illness more passively through only com­
fort care and monitoringP Quite clearly, some degree of self­
interest may be involved as well. Participation in medical research 
enables subjects to enjoy access to investigational technology per­
ceived as cutting-edge, the best available, or the last shot at improv­
ing their health. 
Access concerns of subjects may be acute because of the lim­
ited opportunities patients have to receive investigational technol­
ogy outside of clinical trials. Consider, again, the example of 
experimental medication. FDA rules allow investigational new 
drugs to be prescribed, in applicable situations, for treatment pur­
poses (so-called "treatment INDs").ls FDA procedures also allow 
for accelerated approval of certain drugs and biological products 
used to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses.19 Nonetheless, ac­
17. See Nancy E. Kass & Jeremy Sugarman, Trust: The Fragile Foundation of 
Contemporary Biomedical Research, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP., SEPT.-Ocr. 1996, AT 
25; David T. Stern, Future Challenges From the U.S. Perspective: Trust as the Key To 
Clinical Research, 15 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 87, 88-89 (2004). 
18. See Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b) 
(2008). The regulations generally allow treatment use of an investigational new drug if: 
(1) the medication will be used to treat a "serious or immediately life-threatening dis­
ease"; (2) "no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy" is available; 
(3) the drug is being tested in a controlled clinical trial or all trials have concluded; and 
(4) the sponsor "is actively pursuing marketing approval" for the drug (i.e., the sponsor 
is taking the necessary regulatory steps in order to offer the drug on the market for 
regular clinical care). Id. 
19. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500-.510, 601.40-.41 (allowing for fast-track approval of 
drugs and biological products providing meaningful therapeutic benefit compared to 
existing treatments); see also Sheila R. Shulman & Jeffrey S. Brown, The Food and 
Drug Administration's Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have 
They Worked?, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503 (1995). 
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cess through these channels remains quite narrow.20 In the recent 
Abigail Alliance litigation, plaintiffs challenged FDA rules that gen­
erally prevent access to Phase I drugs21 if the patient is not partici­
pating in or eligible for a clinical trial.22 The eventual en banc 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that the FDA's restricted access rules did not 
violate constitutionally protected liberty interests of terminally ill 
patients.23 Although the FDA won the case, the agency has been 
developing its own proposal to expand access to unapproved 
drugs.24 Yet, even under the new agency approach, access to inves­
tigational drugs for patients not participating in clinical trials will 
likely remain limited.25 
Reimbursement issues further influence access demands of re­
search subjects. In a clinical trial, the study technology is typically 
paid for by the trial sponsor.26 Also, subjects in clinical trials are 
20. The FDA rarely allows treatment INDs and when allowed, this access is typi­
cally only for drugs undergoing later stages of clinical trial testing (Phase III trials or 
after). See Meghan K. Talbott, The Implications of Expanding Access to Unapproved 
Drugs, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316 (2007). For an explanation of the differing phases of 
clin.ical trial testing, see note 2121 infra. Even for drugs involving immediately Iife­
threatening diseases, the FDA has generally restricted INDs to drugs that have already 
completed Phase I testing. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a). 
21. Investigational new drugs typically undergo different phases of clinical trial 
testing. Phase I studies establish levels of tolerance to determine safe dosage levels. 
The typical Phase I study involves a small group of subjects (in the range of twenty to 
eighty) compared to later phase trials. If deemed nontoxic, a drug passes into Phase II, 
where it is tested to demonstrate efficacy and relative safety. Phase III studies involve 
expanded controlled and uncontrolled clinical trials and further, more comprehensive 
evaluations of efficacy and safety. See 21 c.F.R. § 312.21. 
22. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es­
chenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
23. Id. at 713. 
24. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 
75,147 (Food & Drug Admin. Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
25. For example, under the FDA's new proposal, expanded access outside of a 
clinical trial is available only after the FDA determines that there is no comparable or 
satisfactory alternative therapy. Also, the FDA must determine that expanded access 
outside of a clinical trial does not impede the ability to enroll subjects in research stud­
ies needed to further evaluate the technology for efficacy and safety. See id. at 75,150­
151. Further, it is not clear whether sponsors will have strong enough incentives to 
offer their experimental drugs outside of clinical trials given the potential costs involved 
and the complications that expanded access can create regarding sponsors' ability to 
conduct further clinical trial testing. See, e.g., Judy Vale, Note, Expanding Expanded 
Access: How the Food and Drug Administration Can Achieve Better Access to Experi­
mental Drugs For Severely III Patients, 96 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2160 (2008). 
26. See Gina Kolata & Kurt Eichenwald, For the Uninsured, Drug Trials Are 
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,1999, at Al (explaining that drug trials are particu­
larly attractive to the uninsured because of the chance to obtain free treatment). 
420 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:411 
monitored for the accrual of study data and so enjoy more regular 
contact with health care providers and more opportunities for ancil­
lary health care that the sponsor may also pay for.27 Thus, patients 
lacking good (or any) health insurance may look to continued 
clinical trial participation as a way to obtain coverage for basic 
health care services, let alone investigational technology.28 
In addition, powerful advocacy groups, including organizations 
for persons with HIV/AIDS and breast cancer, have influenced 
public perceptions about medical research, likely fueling research 
subjects' access demands. These groups have lobbied vigorously for 
increased research opportunities and for loosening the perceived ri­
gidity on clinical trial eligibility.29 Unfortunately, these groups may 
also be conveying unrealistic expectations of benefits from investi­
gational technology, while glossing over the inherent risks of using 
experimental interventions.30 
B. Recent Representative Disputes 
In recent litigation, subjects' post-trial access claims have met 
with very limited success. It appears that investigators, and particu­
larly trial sponsors, enjoy considerable discretion in offering sub­
jects access to the investigational technology after the research is 
over. 
1. The Amgen Cases 
The recent litigation involving the pharmaceutical company 
Amgen demonstrates this pattern.31 Amgen sponsored multicenter 
studies of an investigational drug for treating Parkinson's Disease. 
27. See generally Roger Brownsword, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Re­
searchers: Reasonable But Not Great Expectations, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 679 (2007). 
28. See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 2626; see also Grady, supra note 1515, 
at 435 ("If patients everywhere had better access to needed treatments, continued ac­
cess to treatment at the end of a trial would be primarily a temporary issue. Research is 
only one way of contributing to improved access to health care."). 
29. See generally REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION: PA­
TIENT ADVOCACY AND RESEARCH ETHICS (2001). 
30. See id. at 58-60 ("Advocacy literature often refers to investigational agents 
and procedures as 'new treatments' and calls studies on terminal conditions 'life saving 
research.' The possibility that research interventions might prove ineffective or more 
risky than standard therapy is seldom broached. Instead, advocates equate clinical tri­
als and medical treatment. "). 
31. See Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen, 
Inc. (Suthers /I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ruling on motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs' claims); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (preliminary injunction ruling). 
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The study medication, a synthetic protein called glial cell line­
derived neurotrophic factor (GDNF), was tested in a series of 
Phase I and Phase II studies, beginning in 2000-2001, at different 
medical centers around the country. Amgen had strong hopes for 
commercializing GDNF after having acquired the biotechnology 
company that initially developed it in a multimillion dollar acquisi­
tion. But the initial trial results proved disappointing. Some sub­
jects showed improvement in mobility, but not by large enough 
degrees to be statistically significant. Meanwhile, safety concerns 
emerged. Monitoring revealed that some subjects had developed 
neutralizing antibodies that could attack naturally occurring GDNF 
in their bodies and could make their conditions worse. Also, brain 
lesions and related potential neurotoxic responses were found in 
primates undergoing animal studies of GDNF. In 2004, Amgen an­
nounced that it would end all clinical trials of GDNF. Amgen 
based this decision on safety concerns combined with an apparent 
lack of efficacy shown in the trial results. The FDA stated that it 
would allow Amgen to continue to provide the drug post-trial to 
certain subjects under its limited "compassionate use" program.32 
But the agency also said the decision to do so was up to Amgen, 
and Amgen declined. 
Some subjects were fiercely convinced that the study drug 
worked and wanted to continue taking it notwithstanding the new 
safety concerns.33 Individuals enrolled in multicenter studies at 
New York University Medical Center and the University of Ken­
tucky Medical Center brought separate federal lawsuits against the 
pharmaceutical company, seeking to compel Amgen to continue 
providing them access to GDNF.34 Each lawsuit asserted nearly 
identical legal claims: breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and 
breach of fiduciary duty. Both the Southern District Court of New 
York (Suthers v. Amgen, Inc.)35 and the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit (Abney v. Amgen, Inc.)36 ruled against the SUbjects. 
32. Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 423. Under "compassionate use" programs, the 
FDA gives special approval for a drug not approved for any use to be administered to a 
limited number of patients with serious and life-threatening illnesses. See id. at 423 n.6; 
Benjamin R. Rossen, FDA's Proposed Regulations to Expand Access to Investigational 
Drugs for Treatment Use: The Status Quo in the Guise ofReform, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
183, 194 (2009). 
33. Abney, 443 F.3d at 544-45; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
34. Abney, 443 F.3d at 545; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 419. 
35. Slithers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 430. 
36. Abney, 443 F.3d at 553. 
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Both of the Amgen courts followed very similar reasoning in 
finding that the subjects had properly been denied post-trial access. 
Several plaintiffs argued that they had been promised in the in­
formed consent documents that they could elect to continue with 
GDNF for another twenty-four months at the study's conclusion.37 
Several plaintiffs further contended that an investigator had made 
representations that if the treatment was at all successful, Amgen 
would keep them on the drug for an indefinite period.38 Yet both 
courts rejected the breach of contract claims, finding that Amgen 
did not enter into any contract with the subjects.39 The courts rea­
soned that the informed consent document was between the univer­
sities/investigators and the subjects, while the contract for 
conducting the research (a distinct Clinical Trial Agreement) was 
entered into between the universities/investigators and Amgen.40 
In this complex web of contractual relationships, there were, impor­
tantly, no direct agreements between Amgen and the subjects, and 
so the subjects' breach of contract claims against Amgen failed. 41 
Similarly, the courts held that any promissory estoppel claims 
could not succeed against Amgen.42 The courts found that Amgen 
made no direct promises to the subjects. All enrollment discussions 
were between the investigators and the subjects and did not include 
Amgen. The courts further indicated that even if a contract or en­
forceable promise had been formed between Amgen and the sub­
jects, the informed consent documents and Clinical Trial 
Agreements did not make an unconditional promise to provide the 
study drug ad infinitum.43 Instead, these documents informed sub­
jects that the study could be terminated at any time by notice from 
Amgen and that the study could be terminated for scientific rea­
sons, such as the safety and efficacy issues asserted by Amgen.44 
Both courts likewise rejected the claims that Amgen had a fi­
duciary duty to provide a potentially beneficial study drug to the 
37. Id. at 544. 
38. See Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25. 
39. Abney, 443 F.3d at 548-49; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26. 
40. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 547; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
41. Abney, 443 F.3d at 547-49; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424-26; see also Vi­
nion v. Amgen, Inc. 272 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th CiT. 2008) (affirming dismissal of breach of 
contract claim and various agency claims against Amgen for failing to provide the study 
drug following termination of the clinical trial). 
42. Abney, 443 F.3d at 550; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 426. 
43. Abney, 443 F.3d at 547 n.5; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
44. Abney, 443 F.3d at 547 n.5; Slithers 1,372 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
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subjects.45 The courts found no special duties arising between 
Amgen and the trial subjects. The courts reasoned that the trial 
sponsor stood in an indirect position too far removed from the sub­
jects to have formed a fiduciary relationship with them.46 
The Amgen cases illustrate the difficulties that subjects have in 
asserting cognizable legal claims, especially against trial sponsors, 
for post-trial access. It remains unclear whether the subjects' claims 
failed primarily because Amgen had serious safety and efficacy rea­
sons for denying continued access. Some of the principal investiga­
tors at different research sites vigorously disagreed with Amgen's 
conclusions and wanted to continue the trial or implement some 
form of compassionate use for enrolled subjects.47 It is also not 
clear to what extent the safety and efficacy issues raised by Amgen 
were a pretext for the sponsor's more bottom-line financial reasons 
for terminating the study. The plaintiffs claimed that Amgen sim­
ply decided to terminate the trials because GDNF was not likely to 
turn a profit.48 The plaintiffs contended that Amgen might have 
been concerned about diminishing revenue margins because its pat­
ent on the drug was soon to expire, only a limited number of pa­
tients would likely use the drug because of the invasive means used 
to deliver it, and the drug had a short shelf life.49 Nonetheless, 
Amgen vigorously denied that it had decided to end the studies pri­
marily due to financial reasons.50 However, as a doctrinal matter, 
given the courts' views that the trial sponsor had no clear contrac­
tual obligations or fiduciary duties to the subjects, it is highly debat­
able what constraints the courts would have been willing to impose, 
if any, on Amgen's ability to terminate the study and block contin­
ued access abruptly, even if the trial sponsor lacked valid safety and 
efficacy reasons. 
2. Other Representative Disputes 
Clinical trial testing often yields data that is neither clearly pos­
itive nor clearly negative. Instead, the results suggest that the in­
vestigational technology offers limited efficacy, marginal 
improvement, or, at best, performs no worse than existing treat­
ments. Such ambiguous data can be interpreted very differently by 
45. Abney, 443 F.3d at 550; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429. 
46. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 550-51; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 426-29 & n.9. 
47. See, e.g., Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
48. See Abney, 443 F.3d at 545. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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stakeholders with distinct agendas. Not surprisingly, trials involving 
ambiguous study results frequently lead to post-trial access con­
flicts. These tensions were evident in Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin 
University, litigation involving subjects who had participated in a 
longstanding breast cancer vaccine study at Rosalind Franklin Uni­
versity of Medicine and Science (Chicago Medical School).51 The 
subjects alleged that the medical school improperly terminated the 
investigation.52 Among other claims, they contended that the con­
sent forms and oral representations made by the researchers indi­
cated that the vaccine treatment would be continued ad infinitum. 
The study's initial principal investigator, Dr. Georg Springer, died 
in 1998 and left a bequest to Chicago Medical School, allegedly to 
help continue funding the study. However, in 2004, the University 
terminated the study after its Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
raised efficacy concerns that the data was too inconclusive to show 
if the vaccine worked.53 The University IRB determined that it was 
not in the subjects' best interests to continue with such unproven 
therapy.54 
Yet many subjects, enrolled in the trial for years, felt the vac­
cine had clearly benefited them and firmly wanted to continue with 
it.55 The plaintiffs included women with stage three breast cancer 
whose advanced disease stages likely precluded them from many 
other clinical trial opportunities and for whom standard treatments 
offered little promise.56 The lawsuit alleged breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, common law fraud, and 
negligence, among other countsY 
The University eventually settled the case so there was no rul­
ing on the merits.58 Although the settlement terms were confiden­
51. Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL 3783418, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2006). 
52. Complaint, Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL 
3783418 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2006) (on file with the author). 
53. See Natasha Korecki, Women Go to Court for Breast Cancer Vaccine, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Oct. 26,2004, at 12. 
54. See id. 
55. See id. (explaining that despite doubts about the vaccine's effectiveness, at 
least one woman, Catherine Moloney, believed that she was alive today because of the 
vaccine). Indeed, the lack of clear efficacy data was a longstanding problem with the 
clinical trial. Specifically, the study's effectiveness was hard to establish because there 
were no control groups. See id. 
56. See Complaint, supra note 52. 
57. See id. 
58. Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL 3783418, at *1 
(N.D. II\. Dec. 20, 2006). 
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tial, the University apparently agreed to fund a new vaccine 
program for the women at another institution.59 However, the set­
tlement provided the subjects incomplete relief, and the victory was 
somewhat empty in terms of vindicating their clear preferences for 
continued post-trial access.60 The settlement only called for the 
University to help fund the study at another yet-to-be-named insti­
tution, with no guarantee that another institution would actually 
agree to take over a study involving a vaccine of already question­
able efficacy.61 Also it was not clear after the passage of time if a 
key ingredient for producing the vaccine was still readily available, 
making transition of the vaccine study to another institution all the 
more difficult.62 The Pollack litigation reveals the difficult remedy 
problems subjects can encounter in enforcing claims to post-trial 
access. 
Post-trial access disputes often result from poor planning by 
the trial sponsors and investigators about what will happen when 
the study concludes. For example, in a recent clinical trial of an 
experimental vaccine to treat shingles, the study results demon­
strated that subjects who received the study vaccine were far less 
likely to develop shingles or long-lasting pain from the condition 
than subjects who received a placebo.63 Despite such strong evi­
dence that the investigational technology worked, Merck, the drug 
company sponsoring the trial, was unable to switch the placebo sub­
jects over to the experimental vaccine when the trial concluded.64 
The drug maker did not have enough vaccine available for all sub­
jects once the trial ended.65 Indeed, it was unclear whether the pla­
cebo subjects would ever have access before Merck received full 
FDA approval for the vaccine.66 This frustrated access occurred 
59. See Nataska Korecki, Breast Cancer Vaccines Return With Settlement, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at 6. 
60. In 2006, a federal magistrate judge determined that the court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and vacated an earlier 
order that acted to enforce a critical clause of the agreement. Pollack, 2006 WL 
3783418, at *8. One plaintiff told the press, "[w]e wanted our vaccine, that was our 
main thing." Korecki, supra note 59. 
61. See Pollack v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., No. 04C5613, 2006 WL 2868921, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2006), vacated, 2006 WL 3783418. 
62. Kelly Field, Medical School Settles Allegations of Fraud, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC., Nov. 12, 2004, at A34. 
63. Todd Ackerman, Promising Drug Test, Unfulfilled Promise, Hous. CHRON., 
June 15, 2005, at AI. 
64. See id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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even as the subjects alleged that they had been promised the vac­
cine at the end of the trial if it was proven effective.67 Although 
Merck likely knew how many placebo subjects were participating 
and could have anticipated their post-trial access demands, the trial 
sponsor apparently did very little in the planning stages to address 
this.68 Nor is it clear whether the IRBs that approved the shingle 
vaccine protocol sufficiently considered and discussed Merck's lim­
ited plans for post-trial access.69 
II. PosT-TRIAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW 
AND ETHICS GUIDANCE 
As the representative disputes indicate, investigators and trial 
sponsors enjoy considerable discretion in deciding when to termi­
nate a clinical trial and whether to offer subjects any post-trial ac­
cess to the investigational technology. Decisions about post-trial 
access seem largely driven by clinical research norms and industry 
practices. Current law and ethics guidance, unfortunately, offers lit­
tle clear direction on these matters. In short, "[u]ntil recently, regu­
lations and codes of research ethics have been silent about what 
should happen at the conclusion of a clinical study."70 
A. Current Law 
1. Federal Research Regulations 
The federal research regulations governing medical research 
say very little regarding when a trial may be terminated and the 
post-trial obligations to subjects that may arise. The regulations 
also do very little to address the many possible adverse conse­
quences arising from terminating a study.71 The informed consent 
provisions require that subjects be told about "the expected dura­
tion of the subject's participation"72 and reminded that they have 
the ability to "discontinue participation at any time."73 Also, sub­
67. Id. 

6S. See id. 

69. See id. 
70. Grady, supra note 15, at 425. 
71. See Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimen­
tation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 3S ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 63, 131-32 (1993) (discussing proposed amendments to the regulations that 
would clarify and remedy the current situation). 
72. Elements of Informed Consent, 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(I) (200S); General Re­
quirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(I) (200S). 
73. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(S); 45 C.F.R § 46.116(a)(S). 
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jects are to be informed of the "[a ]nticipated circumstances under 
which the subject's participation may be terminated by the investi­
gator without regard to the subject's consent,"74 but such informa­
tion is to be disclosed only '.'when appropriate. "75 
In any event, the regulations do not expressly require disclo­
sure to subjects of detailed information about the myriad reasons 
unrelated to safety, such as lack of financing or changed business 
prospects, that may lead to discontinuation of the study and a de­
nial of post-trial access. Indeed, in Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., some of 
the informed consent documents simply stated that a subject might 
be withdrawn from the clinical trial due to "termination or cancella­
tion of the study by the sponsor. "76 Although this terse statement 
placed no conditions or limitations on why the sponsor might be 
allowed to terminate the trial, and did not even make clear that a 
termination might still arise even if the technology was beneficial, 
the court implicitly found that the narrow disclosure was suffi­
cient.?7 The court relied on this statement to find that subjects were 
adequately put on notice about the possibility of interrupted access 
to the study medication.78 
Apart from informed consent, the federal research regulations 
also require that most applicable clinical trial protocols obtain the 
approval of an IRB before subjects can be enrolled in the study.79 
Yet the regulations do not discuss in any detail to what extent IRBs 
should consider post-trial access plans as part of their protocol re­
view process or what IRBs should ask and require of sponsors and 
investigators regarding post-trial access . 
. Even if an IRB imposes post-trial access requirements as part 
of its conditions for protocol approval, the requirements would be 
difficult to monitor and enforce. IRBs may not even be able to 
gather sufficient information and data on what is happening to the 
subjects after the clinical trial is over to even become aware of a 
brewing post-trial access dispute. 
More importantly, IRBs simply have little authority or clear 
jurisdiction to compel a sponsor or investigator to offer post-trial 
access, or even to require that a trial be continued to a reasonable 
74. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 46.1l6(b)(2). 
75. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b); 45 C.F.R. § 46.1l6(b). 
76. Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers II), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
77. Id. at 485. 
78. Id. 
79. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.103; 45 C.F.R. § 46.109. 
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stopping point before the sponsor or investigator can terminate it. 
A sponsor or investigator can often unilaterally stop a trial simply 
with adequate notice to the IRB. The IRB's enforcement powers at 
that point are quite limited even if it becomes aware of problematic 
conduct by the sponsor in blocking post-trial access. The IRB can­
not terminate or withhold approval for a trial that has already 
ended. It may only be able to deter sponsors indirectly by threaten­
ing not to approve their future protocols at the institutions. 
2. Common Law Contract/Informed Consent 
The traditional common law's general emphasis on individual­
ism and self-reliance would suggest that subjects are free to decide 
whether to enroll in trials that offer limited or no post-trial access to 
investigational technology.80 Absent clear promises or contractual 
obligations made to subjects about post-trial access, the common 
law is unlikely to require it.81 
Yet proving the existence of express agreements or promises 
about post-trial access can become difficult for subjects. First, there 
is the question whether any binding contracts even exist in the med­
ical research context. Although subjects sign written informed con­
sent documents when enrolling in a study,82 some courts have been 
reluctant to find binding contractual obligations in the research set­
ting, treating the informed consent documents as merely notice of 
the subjects' consent rather than an enforceable contract.83 
Even if viewed as contracts, the informed consent documents 
typically are carefully worded to avoid express commitments to 
post-trial access and yet to provide flexibility in allowing for when 
and why the trial may be terminated.84 Some sponsors do offer to 
80. Cf Brownsword, supra note 27, at 687 (contrasting the classic common law 
approach to contracts and torts, which focused on self-reliance and individualism, with 
current approaches, which focus on reliance on others). 
81. See, e.g., Vinion v. Amgen, Inc., 272 Fed. Appx. 582 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming 
a dismissal of a subject's breach of contract and tort claims against Amgen for failing to 
provide the study drug following the termination of the clinical trial). 
82. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25; 45 c.F.R. § 46.116. 
83. See, e.g., Harden v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Ctr., No. 04AP-154, 2004 WL 
2341713 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 19,2004). In Harden, the court rejected a subject's breach 
of contract claim that the defendants had promised the subject medical care for life. Id. 
at *6. The court reasoned that the informed consent document merely served as notice 
of the subject's consent to the investigational procedure. [d. at *5. It was not a legally 
binding contract involving bargained-for promises with sufficient consideration. [d. at 
*7-8. 
84. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 547 n.6 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Even if 
the Informed Consent Document or the Clinical Trial Agreement created a contract 
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provide continued post-trial access for a limited time after the trial 
formally ends, but these developments are ad hoc rather than com­
mon practice.8s 
Further complicating matters, as demonstrated in the Amgen 
cases,86 is the fact that even if the informed consent document 
makes express promises to subjects about post-trial access, the 
sponsor is typically not a signatory to this document. Thus, 
promises made in the informed consent document may not bind the 
sponsor. Yet the sponsor, not the investigator or medical center, 
usually controls access to the study technology, at least with pri­
vately funded studies involving an external sponsor. It is especially 
revealing that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir­
cuit in Abney v. Amgen, Inc., although unwilling to find liability 
against the defendant trial sponsor, nonetheless took the unusual 
step in its opinion of openly lamenting the poor state of informed 
consent about post-trial accessP The court called on parties not 
even involved in the litigation (and therefore not subject to the 
court's immediate jurisdiction) to work harder to ensure that sub­
jects were better informed about what would happen at the end of a 
clinical trial: 
Moreover, the litigation in this case indicates that the University, 
through its Informed Consent Document, and its other represen­
tations to the plaintiffs did a poor job informing the plaintiffs as 
to the grounds upon which the study would terminate and their 
access to GDNF would be denied. We urge the University's In­
stitutional Review Board, and other review boards throughout 
the Circuit, to take additional measures to ensure that patients 
fully understand that even if they or their physicians believe an 
experimental treatment to be safe and efficacious there may be 
circumstances under which they will be denied continued access 
to treatment. If this fact had been properly explained to the 
plaintiffs in this case prior to the outset of the clinical trial (and 
between Amgen and the plaintiffs, Amgen would still have no duty to provide the 
plaintiffs with [the drug] .... [T]he Clinical Trial Agreement specifically allowed Amgen 
to terminate the agreement 'immediately upon written notice."'); supra note 76 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Amgen informed consent document's phrasing on 
when the trial could be terminated). 
85. See Grady, supra note 15, at 429-30. 
86. See Abney, 443 F.3d 540; Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers II), 441 F. Supp. 2d 
478 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005); see also discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
87. Abney, 443 F.3d at 551 n.6. 
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spelled out clearly in the Informed Consent Document) perhaps 
the litigation in this case could have been avoided.88 
The fact that the court took this extraordinary step of issuing 
an open call urging change throughout the circuit regarding how 
IRBs conduct their protocol reviews and what subjects are told 
reveals the current limited reach of the common law. However 
bothered the court may have been about Parkinson's Disease trial 
subjects' possible misunderstanding and detrimental reliance on a 
belief that they could continue with GDNF, the court was unable to 
find the informed consent problems actionable against Amgen, the 
actual defendant in the case.89 Amgen was not a party to the In­
formed Consent Document and did not enroll the subjects, yet as 
the trial sponsor it controlled access to the technology.90 
3. 	 Unclear Legal Duties in the Investigator-Subject 
Relationship and Limited Duties Between 
Sponsors and Subjects 
A further reason that the law provides unclear direction as to 
any post-trial access obligations owed to research subjects is be­
cause the more general duties of care that are owed to research 
subjects remain legally uncertain. The common law views many as­
pects of the physician-patient relationship as fiduciary in nature and 
often imposes heightened duties of care and loyalty on the physi­
cian.91 But fiduciary principles may not apply to the investigator­
88. 	 Id. 
89. 	 [d. at 55l. 
90. It should be noted that despite the court's implied suggestion that the plain­
tiffs' real grievance was with the investigators and the University, not the sponsor 
Amgen, even an informed consent claim against these other parties would likely run 
into problems. Even if misleading statements about post-trial access were made, for a 
viable informed consent claim to succeed, plaintiffs would typically have to prove the 
additional elements of causation and damages. In other words, plaintiffs would have to 
show that any negligent information disclosure caused them tangible, physical harm. 
This proof can be especially hard for research subjects to satisfy. Often in a medical 
study the technology in question is investigational and its risks and benefits are still 
largely unknown, making it quite speculative and difficult to prove through litigation 
that deprived access to the investigational technology made subjects therapeutically 
worse off. See generally Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. 
ON. L. REV. 941, 963-65 (2006). 
91. Even in regular doctor-patient relationships, courts have found physicians lia­
ble for breach of fiduciary duty in only limited scenarios, such as failure to secure in­
formed consent or to maintain confidentiality. See Maxwell 1. Mehlman, Fiduciary 
Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 
U. PITT. L. REv. 365,401-14 (1990) (finding inconsistency in how courts apply fiduciary 
principles to different health care relationships); Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fidu­
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subject relationship. The classic fiduciary has undivided loyalty to 
and acts in the best interest of the principal.92 But an investigator 
cannot have undivided loyalty to and always act in the best interest 
of the subject.93 The protocol will demand that consistent study 
procedures be followed in order to yield generalizable data. This 
limits the ability of the investigator to provide individually tailored 
care and to act solely in the best interest of the subject.94 Also, the 
principal aim of a study is to benefit future patients, not the imme­
diate subject, through the knowledge gained. Because of the re­
searcher's experimentation goals rather than clinical care focus, the 
principal-investigator relationship fits quite awkwardly into the fi­
duciary framework.95 
On the other hand, some commentators urge imposing full fi­
duciary or fiduciary-like duties upon investigators.96 The relation­
ship between investigator and subject features power and 
informational asymmetries, the vulnerability and potential for ex­
ploitation by one party, conflicts of interest affecting the more pow­
erful party, and significant trust, dependence, and expectations of 
confidence. These factors are typically found in fiduciary relation­
ships and arguably support requiring investigators to meet height­
ened duties of care and loyalty to subjects.97 
ciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care 
System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 247-S1 (199S) (discussing the application of fiduciary 
standards to physicians). 
92. See Rodwin, supra note 91, at 243 ("The law defines a fiduciary as a person 
entrusted with power or property to be used for the benefit of another and legally held 
to the highest standard of conduct."). 
93. See Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at AI. Dr. David S. Schimm is quoted as stating: "'What the 
patients are not seeing is that the clinical investigator is really a dual agent with divided 
loyalties between the patient and the pharmaceutical company.'" Id. 
94. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 
10 (2d ed. 1986) ("The deprivation of the experimentation ordinarily done to enhance 
the well-being of a patient is one of the burdens imposed on the patient-subject ...."). 
9S. See E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary: Discarding a 
Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS S86 (200S). Indeed, in the first Suthers v. 
Amgen, Inc. case, the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in finding 
that the trial sponsor had no fiduciary duties, questioned whether even the investigators 
or academic medical centers with more direct connection to research subjects had clear 
fiduciary duties to the subjects. Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers /), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 
427 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 200S). 
96. See, e.g., Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 14, at 109-10; Angela R. Holder, 
Do Researchers and Subjects Have a Fiduciary Relationship?, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. 
RES., Jan. 1982, at 6. 
97. See Holder, supra note 96; see also Coleman, supra note 14, at 431-32. 
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A somewhat in-between position urges application of a "partial 
entrustment" model to the investigator-subject relationship.98 
Under this view, investigators have special responsibilities toward 
subjects because subjects have given investigators permission to ac­
cess and collect confidential health information, perform tests, ob­
tain samples, and undertake other procedures. Investigators enjoy 
considerable discretionary power because of this grant of permis­
sion. Subjects are seen as partially entrusting their health to investi­
gators, suggesting that investigators have accompanying 
responsibilities for the subjects' health.99 These duties of care may 
not be as strong as those in the ordinary doctor-patient relationship 
but should involve some limited responsibilities to protect subjects 
from harm.loo 
While academic commentators have supported the partial en­
trustment model,101 it has yet to be clearly adopted in the limited 
case law involving medical research. Indeed, there is very little in 
the way of controlling precedent that helps determine the legal na­
ture of the investigator-subject relationship.102 Thus, the question 
remains whether researchers and subjects are in a classic fiduciary 
relationship, a quasi-fiduciary relationship, a special relationship, 
fall under the partial entrustment model, or are simply parties inter­
acting at arms length. Because the individualized care and loyalty 
obligations that investigators may owe to subjects are not well de­
fined, understandable confusion exists about whether the investiga­
tor has any duty to ensure a subject's post-trial access to the 
investigational technology. 
98. See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsi­
bilities of Medical Researchers, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.·Feb. 2004, at 25, 27. 
99. See id. at 27-32. 
100. See id. at 28. 
101. See, e.g., id. 
102. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A.2d 807, 849-52 (Md. 2001), 
which involved research on lead-paint abatement in homes rented to families with chil­
dren, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the researchers had heightened obliga­
tions toward the subjects. The court's reasoning, however, remains ambiguous as it 
identified several possible sources for imposing heightened obligations, including the 
"special relationship" that might exist between researcher and subject, the special 
quasi-contract between the parties established by the informed consent document, du­
ties derived from the federal research regulations, and duties implied from international 
ethics standards such as the Nuremberg Code. See id. Thus, Grimes does not provide 
clear answers to whether an investigator has heightened obligations premised solely on 
special relationship/fiduciary duty theories. Moreover, Grimes has not been widely fol­
lowed to date. 
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As for trial sponsors, existing precedent suggests that the du­
ties that sponsors owe to subjects are quite narrow and perhaps 
even more limited than the duties that investigators owe subjects. 
Recall that in both Amgen cases the courts were unwilling to find 
that the trial sponsor had a fiduciary relationship with the subjects 
that triggered heightened duties of care.103 The courts reasoned 
that the sponsor had no contact with the subjects and imposing a 
fiduciary duty would be inconsistent with sponsors' loyalties to the 
protocol as a whole and their need to maintain sufficient distance to 
pursue legitimate research ends.104 Moreover, a sponsor, even 
more than an investigator, has more plainly apparent loyalties to 
the scientific protocol. Thus, the fiduciary paradigm of undivided 
loyalty to subjects seems particularly ill-fitting when applied to the 
trial sponsor. 
B. Ethics Guidance 
Current ethics guidance similarly remains underdeveloped. 
Closest on point is the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the 
World Medical Association (WMA).105 As revised by the WMA in 
2008, the Helsinki Declaration now states that "[a]t the conclusion 
of the study, patients entered into the study are entitled ... to share 
any benefits that result from it, for example, access to interventions 
identified as beneficial in the study or to other appropriate care or 
benefits."lo6 In 2004, after much debate over an earlier provision 
regarding post-trial access, the WMA issued a clarification stating 
that it was 
reaffirm[ing] its position that it is necessary during the study 
planning process to identify post-trial access by study participants 
to prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures identified 
as beneficial in the study or access to other appropriate care. 
Post-trial access arrangements or other care must be de­
scribed in the study protocol so the ethical review committee may 
consider such arrangements during its review.107 
103. Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen, 
Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
104. Abney, 443 F.3d at 550-551; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 426-29. 
105. See WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS <j[ 33 (2008), http:// 
www.wma.netle/policy/pdfl17c.pdf [hereinafter WMA Ethical Principles]. 
106. Id. 
107. See Press Release, World Medical Association, Clarification on Declaration 
of Helsinki (Oct. 11, 2004), http://www.wma.netle/press/2004_24.htm. 
434 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:411 
The Declaration of Helsinki revisions were undertaken in re­
sponse to concerns about international HIV trials and exploitation 
of subjects in developing countries. lOS Many of the subjects, be­
cause of cost barriers and limited sponsor plans for distribution, 
were unlikely to receive the investigational technologies once they 
were approved for commercial use in the United States and other 
developed countries. Yet these subjects bore much of the risk of 
clinical trial testing. 109 
The revisions to the Declaration of Helsinki appropriately 
highlight the importance of anticipating post-trial access needs of 
research subjects.110 Further, the Declaration revisions implicitly 
recognize that it is inequitable and ethically troubling to deny sub­
jects access to beneficial study technology at the end of a trial when 
their efforts involved risk and were critical for generating the re­
search data that demonstrated the technology's efficacy. Nonethe­
less, the Declaration revisions unfortunately leave many important 
questions unanswered. 
First, what level of benefit must a study technology offer to 
trigger an ethical obligation of ensuring that subjects have post-trial 
access? The Declaration states the obligation as only to offer sub­
jects access to interventions "identified as beneficial in the 
study."l1l But many clinical trials fail to generate data that unam­
biguously shows that the study technology offers clear improvement 
over existing treatments. Instead, the data can be murky. Is there 
still a strong ethical obligation to provide willing subjects continued 
access to investigational technology shown to be only marginally 
more effective than existing treatments? What if the technology re­
quires further stages of testing before issues of comparative benefit 
can be more definitively resolved? Do subjects who participated in 
now completed trials still have a meritorious claim to post-trial ac­
cess pending further testing? Indeed, for such reasons, the Declara­
tion of Helsinki's provisions become particularly hard to apply to 
early stages of clinical trial testing such as Phase I studies that pri­
108. See Press Release, World Medical Association, WMA to Continue Discus­
sion on Declaration of Helsinki (Sept. 14, 2003), http://www.wma.netJe/press/2003_19. 
htm. 
109. See Editorial, One Standard, Not Two, 362 LANCET 1005 (2003); MORAL 
STANDARDS FOR RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 15. 
110. See WMA Ethical Principles, supra note 105. 
111. Id. 'II 33. 
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marily evaluate toxicity, not efficacy,l12 After a technology has 
completed Phase I testing, or even after limited Phase II trials, 
there still may not be enough useful data generated to determine 
whether the "identified as beneficial in the study" standard applies 
and triggers a post-trial access obligation. 
Second, if there is a legitimate claim by subjects for post-trial 
access, must access be offered for unlimited duration? It is possible 
that subjects may want to continue with investigational technology 
long after the study has ended, especially for treatment of chronic 
diseases. Does the case for continued post-trial access weaken over 
time? Third, the Declaration of Helsinki has very little to say about 
who has the responsibility to ensure that a subject has post-trial ac­
cess-the investigator, the sponsor, the academic medical center 
where the research is conducted? Or is the responsibility shared 
jointly? 
Apart from the Declaration of Helsinki, other ethical guidance 
on post-trial access remains quite limited. For example, the Inter­
national Ethical Guidelines of the Council for International Organi­
zations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) initially advised that agencies 
sponsoring medical research "should agree in advance ... that any 
product developed through such research will be made reasonably 
available to the inhabitants of the host community or country 
[where the research is conducted] at the completion of successful 
testing."l13 A 2002 clarification extends this obligation to sponsors 
and investigators in situations where the research will be conducted 
in a population or community with limited resources and requires 
that the product "or knowledge generated" from the trial be made 
reasonably available after the study's conclusion.1l4 Yet this gui­
dance offers little direction on important details. For example, 
much of the guidance concerns making the technology available to 
the community where the research was conducted.l15 Does this 
mean that residents in the community who did not participate in the 
112. See Michelle M. Mello & Steven Joffe, Compact Versus Contract-Industry 
Sponsors' Obligations to Their Research Subjects, 356 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2737, 2740 
(2007). 
113. COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORG. OF MED. SCI. (CIOMS) & WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(WHO), INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLV­
ING HUMAN SUBJECTS 45 (1993). 
114. See COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORG. OF MED. SCI. (CIOMS) & WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (WHO), INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN­
VOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, at Guideline 10 & crnt. (2002), available at www.ciorns.ch/ 
frarne....guidelines_nov _2002.htrn. 
115. See id. 
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research should have the same degree of post-trial access as the ac­
tual subjects? Is that fair to the subjects who actually participated 
and incurred direct risks? More importantly, it remains unclear 
under the CIOMS guidelines how much benefit an investigational 
technology must offer in order to trigger any post-trial access 
obligations. 
III. WHY REQUIRE POST-TRIAL ACCESS? 
Is it even clear that subjects should enjoy special access post­
trial to investigational technology? This section reviews primary ar­
guments for and against expanded post-trial access. It aims to map 
out the key issues and provide a balanced, more nuanced frame­
work for thinking about post-trial access disputes moving forward. 
A. Reasons for Expanded Post-Trial Access 
An initial reason to provide subjects with greater post-trial ac­
cess is because this is what many subjects expect. Of course, not all 
expectations are reasonable and not all expectations lead to legally 
cognizable claims. But subjects' expectations of post-trial access, 
although often inaccurate, may be quite foreseeable and reasonable 
given the overall context. As noted, many consent forms fail to ap­
prise subjects in sufficient detail of the likelihood of and reasons for 
study termination and subsequent denied access to the investiga­
tional technology, save for terse boilerplate statements that allow 
the subject to be withdrawn upon "termination or cancellation of 
the study by the sponsor."116 Meanwhile, well-documented thera­
peutic misconception problems mean that many subjects already 
have difficulty distinguishing between experimentation and ordi­
nary medical care.117 Some subjects falsely believe that when they 
enroll in a trial, they will receive customary and proven treatment 
tailored to their individual condition. Conflation by subjects of reg­
116. Suthers v. Amgen, Inc. (Suthers /I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
117. See Paul S. Appelbaum et aI., Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Re­
search: Frequency and Risk Factors, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 1 
(discussing the common misconceptions associated with clinical research); Sam Horng 
& Christine Grady, Misunderstanding in Clinical Research: Distinguishing Therapeutic 
Misconception, Therapeutic Misestimation, & Therapeutic Optimism, IRB: ETHICS & 
HUM. RES., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 11, 12-13 (same). 
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ular clinical care and medical research continues to be a recurring 
problem. lIS 
Accordingly, it can be expected that many subjects will not pay 
due attention to the salient aspects of a clinical trial that distinguish 
it from ordinary medical care, including, importantly, how the un­
derlying relationship with the health care professional terminates 
and what happens afterward. Some subjects, influenced by thera­
peutic misconception, may think that a clinical relationship will con­
tinue so long as they benefit from participation in the study, similar 
to how an individual physician ordinarily continues to treat her pa­
tient through the whole episode of an illness. Subjects may not 
fully understand that they can be dropped from a study protocol or 
that the experiment itself can be terminated in an entirely different 
manner than a physician terminates a patient from his clinical prac­
tice. Similarly, many subjects are likely not aware of the complex 
web of medical research relationships and contracts that typically 
exist between the trial sponsors, the investigators, and the academic 
medical centers. Accordingly, they may not sufficiently appreciate 
the lesson of the Amgen cases: a promise by the investigator in a 
consent form to provide post-trial access to investigational technol­
ogy may be unenforceable because the sponsor, who is not a party 
to the consent form, usually controls access.119 
In short, many subjects may not anticipate how tenuous their 
post-trial access opportunities are when deciding to participate in a 
clinical trial. This raises significant concerns about the adequacy of 
the consent. It also suggests detrimental reliance by subjects that is 
foreseeable to investigators and sponsors, raising possible promis­
sory estoppel concerns. When there is likely confusion about what 
happens at the end of the clinical trial, limiting post-trial access may 
manipulate and play upon subjects' desperate, uncritical access de­
mands. It seems cruel and inappropriate to invite subjects to enroll 
in a trial and ask them to invest significant personal resources in 
participating without better addressing the possibility that their le­
gitimate access concerns will be frustrated and disrupted when the 
trial concludes. 
Apart from informed consent and promissory estoppel issues, 
legal obligations to provide post-trial access may also arise from the 
118. See Appelbaum et a1., supra note 117, at 1. See generally Franklin G. Miller 
& Donald Rosenstein, The Therapeutic Orientation to Clinical Trials, 348 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1383 (2003) (reviewing various factors that contribute to conflation). 
119. See Mello & Joffe, supra note 112, at 2741; see also supra Part I.B.1. 
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investigator-subject relationship. As previously noted, the legal pa­
rameters of this relationship and whether it imposes any special du­
ties of care or loyalty upon investigators remain subject to 
continued debate.12o To the extent that the relationship could be 
viewed under the partial entrustment model,121 subjects may have 
stronger claims against investigators to ensure broader post-trial ac­
cess. An investigator's limited responsibilities for the subject's 
health under the partial entrustment model could extend to ensur­
ing post-trial access to beneficial technology for some reasonable 
duration. Alternatively, if the investigator-subject relationship is 
viewed as a fiduciary or even quasi-fiduciary relationship, then the 
law should police abuses of trust in the relationship as it does in 
other fiduciary contexts. One way to strengthen the fiduciary 
bonds, preserve trust, and protect subject welfare would be to im­
pose some obligation on the investigator to ensure post-trial access. 
Another related concern is whether denying subjects post-trial 
access is legally actionable abandonment. In ordinary medical care, 
once a physician enters into a treatment relationship with the pa­
tient, the physician has a legal duty not to abandon the patient.122 
This duty is breached when the physician unilaterally ends the 
treatment relationship without providing reasonable notice, and 
when medical necessity requires continued treatment of the pa­
tient.123 The duty of nonabandonment may be thought of as a nec­
essary corollary to and part of the general duty of care arising under 
the doctor-patient relationship or arising from the fiduciary aspects 
of the doctor-patient relationship.124 Abandonment in regular 
clinical settings has typically been actionable as ordinary medical 
malpractice.125 
Of course it remains debatable whether a legal duty of nona­
bandonment should apply with equal force, or at all, to the investi­
gator-subject relationship as it does to the doctor-patient 
120. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
122. See Church v. Perales, 39 S.w.3d 149, 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ("While the 
physician-patient relationship exists, the physician has a duty to continue providing 
care."). 
123. See, e.g., id.; King v. Fisher, 918 S.w.2d 108, 112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). Many 
jurisdictions provide that the treatment relationship may be terminated after appropri­
ate notice to the patient. See Jackson v. Okla. Mem'l Hosp., 909 P.2d 765, 774 & n.38 
(Okla. 1995). Far less clear is whether the physician, to fulfill the duty of nonabandon­
ment, must also actively transition the patient to alternative care. 
124. See Rodwin, supra note 91, at 247-48; see also supra text accompanying note 
91. 
125. See King, 918 S.W.2d at 111. 
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relationship. As noted, investigators conducting research do not 
necessarily assume the same robust duties of care and fiduciary ob­
ligations that arise for physicians treating individual patients. Simi­
larly, investigators might not be held to the same nonabandonment 
obligations as physicians. But if the doctrinal justification for im­
posing strict nonabandonment duties on investigators is unclear, ad­
dressing abandonment hazards in the research context remains 
important, nonetheless, for compelling ethical and policy reasons. 
Blocking access to investigational technology after the trial con­
cludes arguably treats subjects as mere experimental devices to be 
discarded after use. This violates general ethical principles that 
stress the need to treat subjects with dignity and respect as autono­
mous persons.126 Put another way, "[a]bandoning participants at 
the end of a study, when their useful 'life' to the researchers and 
sponsor is over, is fiendish."127 Ethical (and possibly legal) duties 
to subjects, however vague and ill-defined, at least should include a 
commitment to protecting subject welfare,128 and not abruptly jet­
tisoning subjects or losing sight of their interests as soon as they are 
no longer needed to complete the researchY9 Flagrant abandon­
ment conduct, if undeterred, also can create significant distrust by 
research subjects. The larger research enterprise depends on trust 
by subjects to function,130 while endemic distrust seriously under­
mines the ability to recruit subjects for future studies. l3l 
Ethical (if not legal) considerations of reciprocity and social 
contract also support expanding post-trial access opportunities for 
subjects. Subjects enroll in trials with generally unclear opportuni­
ties for therapeutic improvement because the benefits of investiga­
tional technology remain largely unknown pending further 
research.B2 Yet, investigators and sponsors could not complete 
their work and gather needed research data without the effort of 
sUbjects. Arguably, the investigators and sponsors owe something 
back-some form of reciprocal responsibilities or benefits-to the 
126. See LEVINE, supra note 94, at 15-16. 
127. Editorial, supra note 109, at 1005 (discussing limited post-trial access of sub­
jects in the context of research conducted in the developing world). 
128. This minimal commitment can be found under the federal research regula­
tions. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b )(1) (2008) (requiring institutions to file assurances 
detailing their commitment to "protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects"). 
129. See Grady, supra note 15, at 430-31; Saver, supra note 90, at 1004. 
130. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trl/St, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 470-71 
(2002); GaUer, supra note 14, at 356-57. 
131. See GaUer, supra note 14, at 356. 
132. See discussion supra Introduction. 
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subjects to acknowledge, honor, and reinforce these altruistic as­
pects of participating in medical research.133 Similarly, society as a 
whole arguably owes something back to subjects for undertaking 
risks in order to advance medical progress for the good of the popu­
lation.134 Reciprocal obligations suggest that there should be 
greater concern about subjects' general status and ongoing health 
post-trial. These considerations likewise may support reform mea­
sures to ensure that subjects enjoy post-trial access to beneficial in­
vestigational technology. 
B. Problems with Expanded Post-Trial Access 
At the same time, a closer examination of the legal and ethical 
issues suggests that expanding post-trial access is not always neces­
sary or warranted. Moreover, mandating some form of post-trial 
access rights for subjects introduces new concerns and may prove 
counterproductive for health policy. First, reciprocity arguments of 
owing subjects something back as justification for expanded post­
trial access, while ethically appealing, may be overstated. If sub­
jects deserve some form of post-trial access due to their research 
participation efforts, does that diminish legitimate access demands 
of other stakeholders? For example, it is not clear that participating 
subjects deserve preferential access when access opportunities may 
still be foreclosed to other patients.135 Patients with the same type 
of illness as the research subjects could also benefit from access to 
the investigational technology once a clinical trial ends. But these 
similarly situated patients may have no opportunity to receive the 
technology because it is not commercially available until further 
clinical trials are concluded and they may not even be eligible for 
participation in the new studies. 
More generally, a sponsor may only be able to accommodate a 
limited number of individuals seeking post-trial access while the 
technology undergoes further testing in subsequent studies. In such 
circumstances, an ethical presumption, translated into a regulatory 
directive, that trial participants should enjoy post-trial access could 
133. Cf Brownsword, supra note 27, at 680 (discussing reciprocity obligations to 
provide subjects with ancillary care during the course of a clinical trial); Jennifer L. 
Gold & David M. Studdert, Clinical Trial Registries: A Reform That is Past Due, 33 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 811, 815 (2005) (discussing the research enterprise as a form of social 
contract). 
134. See Grady, supra note 15, at 430. 
135. See Maria Merritt & Christine Grady, Reciprocity and Post-Trial Access for 
Participants in Antiretroviral Therapy Trials, 20 AIDS 1791, 1792 (2006). 
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mean that the subjects in reality have preferred and exclusive access 
compared to other patients. Reciprocity concerns of owing some­
thing back to subjects do not necessarily support displacing other 
patients also in need and postponing their opportunities for thera­
peutic improvement. In trying to reward subjects with reciprocal 
benefits, it is important not to impose disproportionate burdens on 
other patients by further impeding or delaying their access.136 
Second, as with reciprocity, concerns about abandonment do 
not necessarily support robustly expanding subjects' post-trial ac­
cess. Because the investigator's duty of care to subjects may be 
more limited than the duty that arises in the ordinary physician­
patient relationship, and the investigator does not undertake to pro­
vide individualized care,137 nonabandonment restrictions seemingly 
should apply with less force in the research context than in ordinary 
clinical care. Arguably, the investigator's primary duties to the sub­
ject end when the protocol is carried out faithfully to its stopping 
point. Much of the conduct that defines the investigator-subject re­
lationship has already ended upon the suspension of research activi­
ties at the protocol's conclusion. After that, there is little, if any, 
continuing research relationship to speak of. Hence, any accompa­
nying duty of nonabandonment should also diminish because the 
essential research activities that were at the heart of the relation­
ship are already coming to an end. While investigators may have an 
obligation to let subjects down easily and respectfully at the end of 
a trial, it is not clear that abandonment concerns require that a sub­
ject's access to investigational technology be continued when the 
investigator-subject relationship terminates. 
Moreover, even in the ordinary doctor-patient relationship, 
nonabandonment obligations are not unlimited and abandonment 
concerns do not justify imposing a duty on physicians to continue 
all forms of personalized care that may be responsive to the pa­
tient's circumstances.138 The traditional common law approach is 
quite flexible and supportive of physicians seeking to end a treat­
ment relationship with a patient. So long as the physician gives 
proper notice to the patient that the treating relationship will end, 
generally the cessation of care is not actionable, even if the physi­
136. Id. 
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
138. See, e.g., Edmund D. Pellegrino, Nonabandonment: An Old Obligation Re­
visited, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 377 (1995). 
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cian has no clear reason for the termination of care. 139 Accord­
ingly, investigators might simply minimize any abandonment 
concerns by giving proper notice to subjects when all study-related 
activity will end. Also, some jurisdictions recognize abandonment 
claims only if the termination of care occurs when the patient is at a 
critical stage or in need of immediate medical attention.140 Not all 
subjects at the end of a clinical trial will even be able to meet such 
criteria. Their continuing medical concerns may be quite personally 
important, but their clinical conditions are nonetheless not in a suf­
ficiently acute stage. 
Third, expanded post-trial access is not necessarily the appro­
priate remedy for the problems at hand. As noted, post-trial access 
disputes raise serious concerns, among other issues, of informed 
consent and therapeutic misconception problems.141 Claims that 
subjects have been misled and even exploited underlie many of 
these disputes.142 They may not fully appreciate how tenuous their 
post-trial access opportunities are, both because of their confusion 
about the differences between research and individualized care and 
their general desire to access investigational technology. But, if 
true, is the essential harm that needs remedying exploitation or de­
ception? The distinction matters in terms of possible responses. If 
subject deception becomes the principle area of concern, then the 
usual regulatory response to deception is to require more accurate 
and complete disclosure going forward. Thus, to the extent that de­
ception is the problem, requiring additional benefits post-trial (in­
cluding the benefit of post-trial access) is not the obvious regulatory 
solution.143 
Fourth, requiring increased post-trial access may simply exac­
erbate rather than appropriately address therapeutic misconception 
problems. Subjects in a clinical trial may be convinced that an in­
vestigational technology is ordinary clinical care precisely because it 
has been offered to them post-trial. Yet the particular trial that just 
concluded may have represented only a partial assessment of the 
technology, and the technology may require further evaluation 
139. Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 
511, 529 (1997). 
140. See, e.g., Miller v. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp., 508 A.2d 927, 929 (D.e. 1986); 
Surgical Consultants, P.e. v. Ball, 447 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). 
141. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, 443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. Amgen, 
Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
142. See, e.g., Abney, 443 F.3d 540; Suthers I, 372 F. Supp. 2d 416. 
143. See Moral Standards for Research in Developing Countries, supra note 15, at 
19. 
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before firmer conclusions can be drawn about its appropriate use in 
regular clinical care. 
Fifth, even if subjects deserve greater post-trial access, it is im­
portant to impose acceptable boundaries. Not all post-trial access 
claims will be equally valid, and the force of any right to post-trial 
access will likely vary depending on a number of context-specific 
factors. For example, even if the partial entrustment model or fidu­
ciary law concepts are applied to the investigator-subject relation­
ship, post-trial access claims under either approach would likely 
strengthen depending on a subject's increasing degree of vulnerabil­
ity and dependency and the more significant information and re­
sources that the subject entrusts to the researcher. In contrast, a 
subject's post-trial access claims should arguably weaken when it 
still remains uncertain post-study whether the investigational tech­
nology offers a clear benefit or significant improvement over ex­
isting alternatives. Indeed, the general ethical principle of 
beneficence144 does not mean that subjects are owed the same de­
gree of post-trial access for all clinical trials. The more ambiguous 
the efficacy data associated with investigational technology, the less 
clear the subject's welfare will be negatively affected by blocked 
access, and, accordingly, the weaker a subject's claim to post-trial 
technology necessarily becomes.145 Denying subjects post-trial ac­
cess in situations of unclear efficacy or unclear comparative advan­
tages seems less an act of abandonment or failure to honor duties of 
care and loyalty and more the prudent and necessary allocation of 
limited resources. Some subjects' post-trial access demands may re­
flect sheer desperation. It does not help the research enterprise 
generally, or increase trust in medical research, if subjects can com­
pel the continuation of access to investigational technology as they 
see fit, regardless of a more objective weighing of efficacy and 
safety issues and other larger interests at stake. 
Related to the problem of imposing clear boundaries on when 
subjects can invoke a right to post-trial access is the need to develop 
144. The principle of beneficence in the research setting recognizes the impor­
tance of helping subjects while avoiding the imposition of harm. The beneficence prin­
ciple requires that the risks associated with research be reasonable in light of the 
expected benefits, and that all possible benefits be maximized and the chance of harm 
minimized. See TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 260 (4th ed. 1994). 
145. See Henry S. Richardson, Incidental Findings and Ancillary-Care Obliga­
tions, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 256, 268 (2008) (making a similar point for the related 
issue of when the research team should provide ancillary care during the trial). 
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a better understanding of how much access is appropriate. 146 Must 
investigators or sponsors provide the study technology ad infin­
itum? Does the length of post-trial access depend on whether the 
study was terminated for lack of efficacy or even for safety con­
cerns? Should post-trial access be required only while the study 
technology awaits full regulatory approval and before it becomes 
commercially available? If the technology earns full regulatory ap­
proval but the subject still cannot afford the technology or obtain 
insurance coverage for it, must the investigator or sponsor pay for 
the subjects' continued access? 
Expanded post-trial access also introduces new problems and 
may have negative implications for health policy. Requiring 
sponsors or investigators to ensure subjects' post-trial access will 
increase transaction costs for clinical trials, potentially over-deter­
ring beneficial research and limiting the number and kind of studies 
pursued. Insisting on post-trial access across the board runs the risk 
of paternalism and disrespect for subject autonomy by interfering 
with the decisions of individuals who might rationally choose to en­
roll in trials with limited or no post-trial access rather than forego 
important research opportunities altogether. The chilling effect of 
required post-trial access may prove particularly problematic in 
communities with limited availability to existing health care 
services. Researchers and sponsors will be especially wary of con­
ducting research in such areas in order to avoid being encumbered 
by many post-trial access claims. The additional costs required to 
support greater post-trial access might also mean that limited 
research dollars are diverted away from new studies and toward 
ensuring post-trial access to investigational technology, even tech­
nology that seemingly offers only marginal benefit. 
Also, sponsors and investigators have valid concerns that ex­
panded post-trial access will expose them to greater risk of liabil­
ityJ47 A clinical trial differs from ordinary clinical care in the 
degree of monitoring involved. When the clinical trial is underway, 
and its protocol followed, monitoring procedures are in place to 
collect data, identify safety issues, and evaluate subjects' progress in 
a systematic way, including the continuing review of ongoing stud­
ies performed by IRBs and, when applicable, data safety monitor­
146. See supra Part II.B. 
147. Cf Talbott, supra note 20, at 318 (discussing related liability concerns for 
sponsors and investigators with increasing access to unapproved drugs outside of a for­
mal study). 
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ing boards. But when the clinical trial ends, these formal 
monitoring procedures often end as well. Offering subjects contin­
ued access to investigational technology without more comprehen­
sive monitoring in place runs the risk of the development of 
unanticipated hazards. In addition, investigators may be more vul­
nerable to post-trial claims that they failed to tailor medical treat­
ment for each patient as needed. For example, a subject might 
argue that his clinical condition required changed dosage levels in 
the experimental medication or a different type of screening test. If 
this occurred while the trial was underway, the investigator could 
more easily defend against such negligence claims by arguing that 
the protocol in place required that the investigator follow standard­
ized procedures for all subjects in order to develop generalizable 
research data for the study. Yet post-trial, such defenses may not 
succeed because there is no longer a clear need to follow the 
protocol. 
Finally, and particularly pertinent to this Symposium's theme 
of the complicated connection between technology regulation and 
technology reimbursement, regulatory mandates to expand post­
trial access could have negative and confounding reimbursement ef­
fects. Governmental and private payers look to the results of 
clinical trials as part of their assessment process to determine when 
to selectively reimburse new technologies. But if subjects are rec­
ognized as having more robust rights to post-trial access, this could 
lead to slippery slope problems and inevitable pressures, from both 
subjects and non-subjects, for payers to cover investigational tech­
nologies sooner and more broadly. For example, if subjects of a 
recently completed Phase III trial of an experimental cancer drug, 
now just approved by the FDA, can readily command continued 
post-trial access to the medication, other patients with the same 
condition will increasingly lobby (or even litigate for) their health 
plans to cover it. Payers may have a harder time restricting cover­
age for other patients on grounds that the technology is noncus­
tomary or not reasonably necessary when a large group of subjects 
is receiving the technology. Much attention will likely be focused 
on anecdotal reports of success that subjects experience with the 
drug post-trial. But any such data, seized upon by stakeholders 
seeking greater coverage for all patients, will almost certainly have 
less statistical and predictive significance than data gathered while 
the subjects were on the protocol because of the lack of standard­
ized procedures once the study has ended. Indeed, for legitimate 
reasons, payers might prefer to restrict reimbursement for the re­
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cently approved technology until more significant studies assessing 
its cost-effectiveness can be performed. It is important for compre­
hensive technology assessments to be conducted before widespread 
coverage decisions are made; otherwise, expensive new technology 
will further strain limited health care resources. 
Along the same lines, expanded post-trial access may compli­
cate the ultimate conduct of the underlying study and skew the re­
search findings. A regulatory approach that mandates expanded 
post-trial access invites strategic gamesmanship by certain subjects 
to terminate the trial early. Subjects in blinded, randomized studies 
usually do not know whether they are receiving the experimental 
intervention or the standard treatment to which it is being com­
pared,148 Subjects most concerned about access to investigational 
technology would realize that, while the trial was underway, they 
only have a possible but not guaranteed chance of receiving the in­
vestigational technology due to randomization procedures. But if 
all subjects enjoy a right to post-trial access, each subject's access 
chances actually increase when the study concludes. Accordingly, 
subjects might advocate for early study terminations-or even 
make continuation of the research difficult for investigators-to 
trigger a trial termination and actually increase their access chances. 
The possibility of additional early trial terminations is of consider­
able concern for health policy. It is important to carry clinical trials 
to statistically significant stopping points to ensure that the result­
ing data can better resolve clinical uncertainty and more effectively 
guide future health care treatment, reimbursement, and allocation 
decisions.149 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Providing detailed reform recommendations is beyond this Ar­
ticle's scope. Instead, the focus has been on critically reviewing the 
competing considerations at play in post-trial access disputes and 
identifying the important questions emerging for health law and 
policy. However, the status quo certainly needs improvement. 
Representative disputes, such as the Amgen cases,lS0 indicate that 
investigators and, particularly, trial sponsors enjoy considerable dis­
cretion in rejecting often legitimate and foreseeable post-trial ac­
148. See Menikoff. supra note 8, at 63. 
149. See Stuart J. Pocock, When to Stop a Clinical Trial, 305 BRIT. MED. J. 235 
(1992). 
150. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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cess demands of subjects, which raises many problems.151 The 
challenge is how to navigate an incremental reform approach that 
offers some improvement over the status quo yet minimizes the 
dangers of post-trial access completely unbound. In that spirit, this 
section recommends two preliminary strategies. 
A. 	 More Focused Regulatory Review of Post- Trial Plans and a 
Presumption of Some Post- Trial Access 
Greater transparency about what will happen post-trial would 
certainly help address concerns that subjects are being misled or 
even exploited because of their post-trial access expectations. As 
noted, informed consent documents sometimes provide only brief 
statements about the possibility of study termination or early inter­
ruption and do not usually provide detailed information about post­
trial access to the study technology. The federal research regula­
tions should require that informed consent documents, in order to 
secure IRB approval, provide complete disclosures to subjects 
about when and why the study could be terminated. Also, in­
formed consent documents should be required to have a distinct 
section that identifies what plans, if any, exist to provide the study 
technology to subjects after the trial, including, importantly, who 
will pay for this access. If there are no plans for continued access, 
the informed consent document should be required to explain that 
fact expressly and conspicuously, including statements that subjects 
will have no guarantee of post-trial access even if the technology 
improves their condition. 
IRBs can only properly insist upon and monitor such disclo­
sures in the informed consent documents if they do a better job of 
protocol review in the first place and ferret out what the plans are 
with respect to post-trial access.152 As previously noted, the IRB 
review regulations at present do not provide sufficiently detailed 
instructions to IRBs as to what to look for in protocol applications 
regarding post-trial conduct.153 Recent post-trial access disputes 
disturbingly suggest that IRBs have approved studies with minimal 
inquiry regarding post-trial plans. These cases also suggest that 
sponsors and investigators did not make sufficient transition plans 
151. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2006); Suthers v. 
Amgen, Inc. (Suthers 11), 441 F. Supp. 2d 478 passim (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Suthers v. 
Amgen, Inc. (Suthers I), 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
152. 	 See, e.g., Amgen, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
153. 	 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
448 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:411 
or even budget for the likelihood that subjects would want post-trial 
access.154 
To assist IRBs in monitoring these issues, the federal research 
regulations should require that protocol applications document in 
greater detail what will happen when the study ends, including the 
possibility that the study may be terminated early because of per­
ceived lack of efficacy. This documentation should also make clear, 
for the IRB's consideration and approval, the decision-making pro­
cess to be followed by the sponsor or investigator for determining 
whether the trial results show enough benefit to justify continuing 
post-trial access. The application could include descriptions of the 
criteria to be considered and statistical guidelines to be used. 
Apart from transparency problems, the post-trial needs of sub­
jects seemingly exert only a weak influence at best on sponsor and 
investigator decision making at the end of a study. This lack of con­
sideration of subjects' access preferences has led to poor balancing 
of stakeholder interests and continual conflict. One approach to 
prod sponsors and investigators to consider subjects' access de­
mands more consistently is through regulatory presumptions favor­
ing some form of access. The federal research regulations might, 
for example, state that investigators and sponsors will be expected 
to provide subjects with some form of post-trial access when the 
trial is stopped for reasons other than safety. This default obliga­
tion could only be varied if the initial protocol contains a request to 
modify this obligation, along with justification from the sponsor or 
investigator that explains why no special access is warranted, and 
the IRB approves this variance. A related presumptive approach 
would make it a regulatory requirement that protocols, in order to 
receive IRB approval, include assistance programs that help sub­
jects with maintaining post-trial access for a limited duration, such 
as one year after the study, similar to what some pharmaceutical 
companies already do on a limited basis in particular clinical tri­
als.155 This requirement could be waivable for good cause by the 
IRB. 
A presumptive approach avoids making post-trial access an 
overly burdensome, open-ended obligation for sponsors and inves­
tigators. Instead, it is more likely to result in a finite commitment 
from the sponsor or investigator that would be time-limited and 
154. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing post-trial planning 
and supply problems in the Merck shingles vaccine study). 
155. See Grady, supra note IS, at 429. 
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that could be anticipated and budgeted for in the planning process 
for developing the study. Also, a presumptive approach has suffi­
cient flexibility and recognizes that in some clinical trials, such as 
where the technology offers limited efficacy, continuing post-trial 
access may not be warranted and can be waived for good cause by 
the IRB. 
B. Benefits Other than Post-Trial Access 
Another promising strategy, presently underutilized, is to offer 
subjects other benefits as an alternative to post-trial access to the 
investigational technology. For example, instead of post-trial ac­
cess, subjects could deem it a sufficient reciprocal benefit that their 
community experiences advantages from the research because 
health care professionals in the area receive special training as part 
of the clinical trial.156 Or subjects might receive more personal al­
ternative benefits, such as the opportunity to receive screening and 
primary health services not required under the protocol. All of 
these can be very real gains to subjects. Reciprocity and gratitude 
considerations suggest that subjects should receive something fair in 
exchange for what they have undertaken for society'S benefit, not 
necessarily a specific claim to any particular benefit.157 
Alternative benefits have the advantage of being less burden­
some for sponsors and investigators, avoiding some of the chilling 
deterrent effects that might arise with required post-trial access. 
Alternative benefits can also avoid some of the implementation 
problems that arise with post-trial access, such as how much access 
is enough and whether it needs to be continued indefinitely. Alter­
native benefits may be more predictable, measured more consis­
tently, and valued more highly than differing degrees of post-trial 
access. For example, Phase I drug trials evaluate primarily toxicity, 
not efficacy, of the experimental medicine. Mandating that subjects 
have post-trial access to the study medication after a Phase I trial 
can make things unduly complicated and difficult. A drug that has 
only cleared Phase I testing may still be produced in limited sup­
plies because Phase I testing typically occurs with a smaller group 
of subjects than later testing phases.15s More importantly, many ba­
sic efficacy questions about the drug remain, including what dosage 
156. See MORAL STANDARDS FOR RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra 
note 15, at 20. • 
157. See id. at 19-2l. 
158. See 21 c.F.R. § 312.21(a)(I), (b) (2008). 
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to use and on what schedule, because the medication has not been 
comprehensively tested yet for efficacy. In such situations, alterna­
tive benefits may be much easier to implement and the benefit to 
subjects more clearly understood.159 
Greater use of alternative benefits also directly responds to the 
remedy gaps identified in litigation over post-trial access. Recall 
that in the Amgen cases allegedly misleading promises by the inves­
tigators about post-trial access were not binding on the trial spon­
sor-the party that controlled access to the experimental drug­
because the sponsor was not a party to the informed consent docu­
ments.160 This disconnect between what the investigator may prom­
ise and what actions may be brought against the sponsor to enforce 
access leaves subjects with incomplete remedies and without ade­
quate recourse in response to potentially deceptive or misleading 
disclosures about post-trial access. Yet many alternative benefits, 
such as offering additional health services, are within the more di­
rect control of the investigators. Subjects could more easily enforce 
promises of alternative benefits against investigators, and providing 
alternative benefits may be a more flexible way for investigators to 
discharge any obligations owed to subjects. 
CONCLUSION 
Post-trial access disputes deserve greater regulatory and schol­
arly attention because of the challenging questions raised for health 
law and policy. Sponsors and investigators currently have consider­
able discretion to restrict post-trial access to investigational technol­
ogy. Yet regularly blocking access undermines notions of 
protecting subject welfare, disrupts subjects' foreseeable and often 
legitimate expectations, and raises concerns of abandonment, 
among other problems. At the same time, closer examination of 
the legal and ethical justifications suggests that post-trial access is 
not always necessary or warranted. Subjects' access demands may 
be uncritical and clouded by therapeutic misconception; indeed, 
there are often valid reasons for restricting access. Further, the in­
vestigator'S post-trial obligations to subjects are not necessarily 
equivalent to the continuing treatment duties that physicians owe to 
patients in ordinary clinical care. Thus, it is important to consider 
159. See Moral Standards for Research in Developing Countries, supra note 15, at 
21. 
160. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
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incremental reform approaches that avoid the problems of un­
bounded post-trial access. 
A critically needed next step is to develop regulatory standards 
that provide more transparency to subjects and more upfront dis­
closure to IRBs about post-trial access plans before protocols are 
approved and subjects are enrolled. Other possible reforms worth 
exploring include regulatory presumptions favoring some form of 
time-limited, post-trial access, waivable by an IRB for good cause. 
Complementary to these regulatory changes, greater consideration 
should be given to offering subjects alternative benefits to contin­
ued access. However, these are only preliminary strategies. Much 
important work remains to be done to delineate more clearly the 
obligations owed to subjects at the end of a clinical trial as well as to 
implement policies that can better avoid post-trial access conflicts 
from first developing. 
